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ABSTRACT 
 
Do Hiring Credits Work in Recessions? Evidence from France* 
 
This paper evaluates the impact of an unexpected temporary hiring credit targeted at workers 
paid below 1.6 times the minimum wage in firms with less than 10 employees in France from 
December 2008 to December 2009. Using rich administrative data covering all French firms, 
we find that the program has had a strong and rapid impact on employment. The net cost per 
job created for the government was around zero. The employment effect was stronger in 
areas where recruitment was easier. Although the hiring credit was not conditional on net job 
creation, it did not increase churning of workers. Nevertheless, we estimate that a credit 
conditional on net job creation above the employment growth threshold of -1%, would have 
maximized job creation, and created about 4 times more jobs, at constant budget, provided 
that take-up had remained the same. 
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1 Introduction
At the onset of the Great Recession, on 4 December 2008, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy
announced that workers hired in rms with less than 10 employees at a wage less than 1.6 times
the minimum wage were immediately eligible for employer social contributions relief until 31
December 2009. The amount of this relief was substantial: it reduced the labor cost by 12% at
the level of the minimum wage, decreasing in linear fashion as the hourly wage level rose up to
1.6 times the minimum wage. This paper evaluates the impact of this hiring credit, called zéro
charges.
Hiring credits have been used in the United States and in a number of European countries to
counteract the employment e¤ects of the 2008-2009 recession.1 Despite this wide use of hiring
credits, many economists think that they are probably useless during recessions, where aggregate
demand is insu¢ cient relative to the labor and other resources available in the economy.2 How-
ever, very little is known about the actual e¤ects of hiring credits, because empirical evidence
is very scarce.
The zéro charges program provides an exceptional opportunity to contribute to lling this
gap. This policy measure has several important advantages for the purpose of evaluation. First,
it came as a real surprise: it was announced and implemented on the same day, and kept secret
before its announcement. Second, since for scal reasons only rms with less than 10 employees
before the announcement of the measure were eligible, the hiring credit was arbitrarily restricted
to a subset of rms comparable to others that were not eligible. Third, no other new policy was
targeted at small rms or at low wage workers at the same time. Fourth, there are no signicant
discontinuities at the 10 employees threshold in the French legislation, that would induce a
change in the labor cost or in the labor regulations. These features make the implementation of
zéro charges a natural experiment, allowing us to evaluate (for the rst time, to the best of our
knowledge) the consequences of a non-categorical temporary hiring credit at the rm level with a
proper identication strategy. Moreover, we are able to analyze in detail the consequences of this
natural experiment to the extent that we use a comprehensive database providing information
about employment, hours, hires, separations and wages for all rms on a daily basis since 2005,
as well as the take-up of the measure.
1See OECD (2010) for a detailed presentation of hiring credit measures in 2009.
2For instance, Becker (2010), Posner (2010) and Gali (2013).
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Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy, we compare the evolution of small rms (between 6
and 10 employees) and medium-size rms (between 10 and 14 employees) from November 2008,
just before the introduction of the hiring credit, until November 2009. The estimated elasticity
of employment with respect to the drop in labor cost induced by the hiring credit is about  4, a
very high (absolute) value which can be explained by the fact that the measure was targeted at
low wage workers in the context of a high minimum wage and high unemployment, but also by
the fact that the hiring credit was only for hires. If the measure had concerned all jobs instead, we
show that the corresponding elasticity would have been smaller in absolute value, but still above
one. This nding is consistent with previous estimates which have shown that movements in
the cost of French minimum wage workers are associated with very strong negative employment
e¤ects (Kramarz and Philippon, 2001, and Abowd et al. 2006). The impact of the hiring credit
emerged quickly: hires and employment began to rise three months after the introduction of
the credit. The evolution of hours worked is similar to that of employment, meaning that rms
did not substitute hours of new workers beneting from the hiring credit for those of incumbent
employees. We nd no increase in wages associated with the hiring credit.
We proceed to robustness checks   varying bandwidth, placebo analysis, search for equi-
librium e¤ects   and nd that these results are stable. Accordingly, we conclude that hiring
credits can be e¤ective to boost employment of low wage workers in recessions when there is a
high minimum wage. Nevertheless, we nd that the hiring credit is not always e¤ective. We use
a survey on recruitment shortages which allows us to show that the employment e¤ects of the
hiring credit decrease when recruitment di¢ culties increase. This suggests that hiring credits
are more e¤ective at boosting employment in downturns than in upturns, when labor markets
are tight.
We nd that zéro charges did not induce rms to increase layo¤s in order to hire workers
at lower cost. However, the level of churning of workers in France is high because 90 percent
of entries into employment are on temporary jobs. As a consequence of this high churning,
the hiring credit induces large windfalls for rms. We estimate that about 84 percent of the
hires subsidized by zéro charges would have been created absent the hiring credit. The gross
cost of the hiring credit per job created borne by the government is signicant: it amounts to
about a quarter of the labor cost of a job in the treatment group. To compute the cost per job
created net of savings on social benets, we exploit a survey that provides information about
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the characteristics of the beneciaries of zéro charges. We nd that the hiring credit has been
very e¤ective since the net cost of the hiring credit per job created is about zero.
The importance of windfalls for rms led us to explore the potential impact of hiring credits
conditional on net job creation, like the New Job Tax Credit (NJTC), which subsidized growing
rms during the late 70s in the US, compared with unconditionnal credits like zéro charges or
the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act set out by the Obama administration
in 2009.3 We nd that at constant budget, a credit conditional on net job creation above the
employment growth rate of  1%; would have maximized job creation, creating 4.4 times more
jobs than the non-conditional hiring credit, provided that take-up had remained the same.
Our paper is related to empirical contributions devoted to the impact of hiring credits and
job subsidies. The literature on hiring credits has been recently surveyed in Neumark (2013)
who concludes that they do not have signicant e¤ects on employment when they are targeted at
specic disadvantaged groups (such as disabled workers). Such targeted policies stigmatize their
beneciaries and entail substitution e¤ects. However, Neumark also concludes that non-targeted
hiring credits may have signicant e¤ects on employment during recessions. The evidence comes
from two empirical evaluations of the NJTC (Perlo¤ and Wachter, 1979, Bishop 1981). The
NJTC was the only US hiring credit implemented at the federal level before the HIRE Act. But
at the state level, there were many more hiring credits. Using di¤erence-in-di¤erences across
states, Chirinko and Wilson (2010) estimate that these hiring credits increased employment
during the month when rms both know about, and can qualify for, the hiring credit. Using
a similar identication strategy on a wider set of hiring credits, Neumark and Grijalva (2013)
nd that hiring credits targeting the unemployed, and those that allow US states to recover
credits when job creation goals are not met, appear to have succeeded in boosting job growth.
Neumark and Grijalva also point out that the ine¢ ciencies that arise with certain types of hiring
credits are related to churning behaviors. In European countries, most evaluations are focused
on tax exemptions that reduce labor costs. These exemptions are not targeted at hires: they
3Like zéro charges, the HIRE Act was not restricted to growing rms and it was accessible to a rather large pool
of potential candidates. However, in 2009 the Obama administration originally set out a hiring credit targeting
growing rms only. Eventually, the Congress passed a measure which exempted all employers from their share of
Social Security taxes on wages when hiring unemployed workers into new or existing positions, on top of a general
business tax credit for each worker retained for at least a year (see http://hireact.org/). These convoluted policy
discussions and legislative debates also surrounded the New Job Tax Credit in the 70s. Despite the complexity of
conditionalities, among the 147 hiring credits enacted separately by U.S. states from 1969 to 2012, 143 required
that the number of jobs associated with hires is above specied thresholds (Neumark and Grijavla, 2013).
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apply to the stock of jobs. They have positive employment e¤ects in countries where there are
high statutory minimum wages, such as France4 and Belgium.5 In countries without a statutory
minimum wage, such as Finland6 or Sweden,7 results are more mixed.
We add to the literature by providing the rst empirical evaluation of an unexpected tem-
porary hiring credit using su¢ ciently rich data at the rm level to analyze its e¤ects on a wide
range of outcomes including employment, hours of work, labor turnover, wages, rms survival
and the cost per job created. We show empirically that the impact of hiring credits depends
on labor market conditions and in particular on hiring di¢ culties. We also provide a theoretical
framework that claries the impact of di¤erent types of hiring credits and employment subsidies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hiring credit scheme implemented
in France in 2009 (zéro charges). Section 3 presents the data, descriptive statistics and the
empirical strategy. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the cost of
zero charges per job created and to alternative hiring credit designs. Robustness checks are
presented in section 6. The last section concludes.
2 Institutional background
The zéro charges (zero contributions) measure was announced by the French President on 4
December 2008. According to the original announcement, any hire (or temporary contract
renewal) of a low-wage worker in a rm with less than 10 employees occurring from the date of
the announcement until 31 December 2009 could benet during the same year from an employer
social contribution relief.8 The relief is maximal for workers with an hourly wage at the minimum
wage level (1,338 euros in 2009). With zéro charges, employers do not pay any social contribution
4Crepon and Desplatz (2001), Kramarz and Philippon (2001), Cheron et al (2010) and Barlet et al (2010) nd
positive employment e¤ects of payroll tax exemptions for low wage workers implemented in the early 1990s in
France. Givord et al. (2013) nd that the Zone Franche Urbaine program, comparable to US enterprise zones,
which exempts businesses from taxes for a period of at least ve years, had signicant e¤ects on both business
creation and employment but also had signicant negative spillovers on neighboring areas.
5Goos and Konings (2007) nd a positive employment e¤ect of payroll tax subsidies in Belgium.
6Huttunen et al. (2013) do not nd any positive employment e¤ect of wage subsidies targeted at older,
full-time, low-wage workers in Finland.
7Sianesi (2008) nds that entering a temporary job subsidy program rather than searching further in open
unemployment increases employment rates soon after the program ended in Sweden in the 1990s. Bennmarker
et al. (2009) do not nd any positive employment e¤ects in permanent rms of a 10% payroll tax reduction
introduced in the Northern regions of Sweden in 2002. Egebark and Kaunitz (2013) and Skedinger (2014) nd
that payroll tax cuts for young workers implemented in Sweden in 2007 and 2009 had weak positive e¤ects on
youth employment.
8The new relief is in addition to the existing general social contribution reduction on low wages called the
Fillon reduction, which has prevailed since the 1990s and concerns all rms in the private sector.
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Figure 1: The hiring credit schedule.
Note: The horizontal axis reports the monthly wage (in euros) net of employer social contributions of
a full time worker (1 338 corresponds to the minimum wage in 2009, 1 472 is 1.1 times that amount,
1 605 is 1.2 times and so on). The vertical axis reports the monthly labor cost. The continuous line
displays the labor cost without the hiring credit. The dotted line shows the labor cost with the hiring
credit.
at the minimum wage level. The relief then decreases as the hourly wage level rises up to 1.6
times the minimum wage. Figure 1 shows that the hiring credit reduces the labor cost by 12%
for a full-time worker paid at the minimum wage. The maximum amount of the hiring credit
over 12 months represents 2,400 euros. When the wage is 30 percent above the minimum wage,
the subsidy rate represents only 4 percent of the labor cost.
Before the rst announcement, the policy was not anticipated, because it was kept secret.9
This is illustrated by Figure 2 which shows that Google searches for the item hiring subsidy
(aide embauche) started to increase in December 2008, once the announcement for the program
was made. There is no Google search for the item zéro charges before early 2009.
The practical details of the hiring credit were rapidly make known by decree on 20 December
2008. To start with, only rms and associations belonging to the private sector could get the
9See for instance the newspaper Les Echos, that describes in a paper entilted Le gouvernement envisage
daccélérer ses paiements et remboursements aux entreprises, published on 27 November 2008, all potential
measures that the President Sarkozy was supposed to announce in the Press conference of the 4 December 2008.
The hiring credit is not mentionned in this paper. On 4 December 2008, the paper entilted, Sarkozy dévoile
un plan de 26 milliards deuros pour relancer léconomie, that summarizes the contents of the press conference,
mentions the hiring credit.
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Figure 2: Results of Google search for the policy name.
Note: The vertical axis reports the monthly number of searches for one term relative to the highest point
on the gure; "aide embauche" means hiring subsidy. Variations in spellings (e.g. zéro charges, zero
charge) yield similar patterns as zero charges. Source: Google Trends website.
hiring credit. Firms and associations had to request the additional zéro charges relief for each
hire separately, lling out a one-page form and attaching the labor contract. The claim had to
be sent to the French public employment agency (Pôle emploi).
Second, to be sponsored, hires had to be for jobs lasting at least one month, and not other-
wise sponsored by other targeted special measures, such as even more generous and pre-existing
subsidies for some disadvantaged groups (e.g. the long-term unemployed) or apprentices; house-
hold jobs were also excluded on the ground of their specic and pre-existing subsidies. The
hiring credit was not restricted to rms with net employment growth, and it was not limited to
the hiring of long-term unemployed or any other disadvantaged groups.
Third, only entities with less than 10 full-time equivalent employees10 on average between
January and November 2008 could apply. Hence, the period used to dene the size criteria ends
before the announcement of the policy, on 4 December 2008. A growing rm reaching 10 or
10The size criteria are very precise and follow the usual rules set in the labor code (see cerfa n 13838-01). Only
ordinary employees are kept in the computation of the size (thus excluding apprentices and sponsored employees
and those hired as part of a labor market program). The size is computed as the average of the end-of-month
number of employees from January to November 2008. Temporary workers contribute pro rata temporis their
number of days present in the rm over the month. This means that temporary workers hired on the 15th of the
month working full-time represent 0.5 employees. However, workers hired on permanent contracts are counted as
1 employee during the month no matter what day of the month they were hired on. All wage-earners working
part-time, either on temporary or permanent contracts, are accounted pro rata temporis their regular number of
hours during the month, excluding overtime hours. For instance, wage-earners working mornings only are counted
as 0.5 employee.
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more employees over the year 2009 could still continue to receive subsidies and apply for new
hires until the end of 2009. This meant that the size criteria could not be manipulated by rms
wishing to benet from the hiring credit.
Fourth, applying rms must not have red any workers for economic reasons on the same
job over the 6 months preceding the hiring date, nor must they have red this particular worker
over the same period from any other job, and they must have paid all their previous social
contributions.
On 16 November 2009, the policy was extended to hires occurring up to 30 June 2010. On
this occasion, the duration of the hiring credit was extended for up to 12 months from the hiring
date, instead of the cuto¤ date of 31 December 2009 for the initial scheme. This new rule was
also applicable to hires made in 2009 before the announcement, and which already beneted
from zéro charges. Firms below the average of 10 full-time equivalent employees from January
2009 to December 2009 were also eligible for the extended program for their new hires in 2010.
Hence it is more challenging to study the e¤ects of the policy in 2010, as some rms treated in
2009 may not have been able to apply in 2010, because eligibility for the extended period was
then based on the average size over 2009. Moreover, the period after the termination of zéro
charges cannot be studied yet, since zéro charges provided subsidies until 30 June 2011 and the
data for year 2011 are not yet available.
The hiring credit was initially part of a wider array of policies designed to cope with the
2008-2009 crisis. Within that array, this is the only item specically targeted at small rms,
and the only item directly altering the labor cost. The hiring credits were targeted at small
rms because of government budget constraints. Broadly speaking, there were no other explicit
legal changes in this period that exerted a varying impact on rms with less or more than 10
employees.
As well, there are no signicant discontinuities at the 10-employee threshold in the French
legislation that might induce a change in the labor cost or in the labor regulations (see Ceci-
Renaud and Chevalier, 2010). As a consequence we do not see any accumulation of rms just
below the threshold (see Figure 3). We can thus be condent that there is an absence of sorting
around the size threshold. Such a sorting might have meant that rms below and above the
threshold were reacting di¤erently to the business cycles.11
11This contrasts with the ndings of Gourio and Roys (2012) who report large accumulation at the 50 employees
threshold and moderate at the 10 employees threshold. Their evidence on small rms is less reliable than ours,
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Figure 3: Firm size density. Source DADS.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
We use administrative data from two distinct sources:
 the Déclarations Administratives de Données Sociales (DADS) built by the French Sta-
tistical Institute (INSEE) from the social contributions declarations of rms. Each year
rms declare the employment spells, the number of hours worked, and the associated wages
for each worker.
 the administrative le produced by the French Public Employment Agency (Pôle emploi)
which administered the payment of the subsidy, designated as the hiring creditle. It
contains information on the rms which enrolled in the zéro charges program, the level
of the hiring wage, and the exact amount and duration of the subsidy received.
The DADS cover around 85% of French wage earners. Civil servants from the French cen-
tral administration (government ministries) and workers from the public health care sector or
employed by householders (e.g. for house-keeping or child care) do not appear in this employ-
as they do not observe the whole universe of small rms. Their data is based on a specic scal declaration that
does not cover all small rms.
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Figure 4: Fraction of rms and of hires that beneted from the hiring credit by rm size in 2009.
Note : The take-up rate is the share of rms below ten employees beneting from the hiring credit in
2009; the attention rate is the share of hires with wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage that have
been subsidized in 2009. The rmssize is the number of full time equivalent employees as measured over
the rst 11 months of 2008.
ment register (until 2009). We append the employment registers from 2005 to 2009,12 creating
a panel of rms.13 We restrict the sample to rms in the for-prot private sector and we drop
the agricultural sector as well as associations. We also drop workers in temporary help agen-
cies, as we do not know in which rms they actually work, as well as the 1% of rms with the
highest employment growth rates in the sample.14 All relevant information pertaining to rm
size, the number of hires, separations, the wage levels and the duration of contracts are taken
from the DADS data set which describes the universe of rms relevant to our evaluation. The
eligibility condition based on the size threshold (Full Time Equivalent) is also computed from
the employment register.
Our two data sets can be matched using the rm identier. This enables us to compute the
take-up rate, which corresponds to the fraction of small rms actually beneting from the hiring
credit in 2009. The take up rate amounts to 24%. This low gure is the product of the hiring
rate of low-wage workers and the take-up rate conditional on hiring low-wage workers, which
12The specication about the type of labor contract, either temporary or permanent, is not available before
2005. Since the type of contract is used to compute the number of full time equivalent workers, as explained in
footnote 10, we cannot use the DADS before 2005.
13There is no permanent identier for individual workers. Our data is not a panel of individual workers.
14Further information on data is available in table 14 in the appendix.
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we dene as the attention rate. The attention rate (the share of subsidized hires among eligible
hires with wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage and contract duration above one month)
amounts to 47%. Figure 4 displays the take-up rate and the attention rate by rm size in 2008
(i.e. according to the eligibility criteria). The take-up rate sharply decreases for rms with 8
employees or more and goes to zero for rms larger than 12 employees. Similarly the attention
rate drops before the threshold and it is positive, around 3%, for rms with a workforce of 10
to 12 employees.
To the extent that, as discussed above, rms were not able to manipulate their size to meet
the eligibility criteria, the drop in the attention rate before the threshold of 10 employees and
the positive fraction of rms from 10 to 12 employees beneting from the hiring credit are likely
the consequences of measurement error. The eligibility criterion is di¢ cult to measure precisely
in the employment register at our disposal. In particular, according to the legal rules, workers
hired on permanent contracts are considered to be present in the rm from the beginning of
the month, even if they have been hired during the month. Since we only observe the type of
contract at the end of the year for every worker, we are unable to know whether workers have
been hired on permanent or temporary contracts because temporary contracts may have been
converted into permanent contracts. Another reason could be that computing the eligibility
criterion is a complex task, especially for small rms. Only ordinary employees are kept in
the size computation, excluding apprentices and diverse categories of employees beneting from
other subsidies; employees contribute pro rata temporis but overtime hours are not taken into
account. These features of the eligibility criterion may induce rms to overestimate their size
and to refrain from claiming zéro charges. The resulting absence of discontinuity in the take-up
rate prevents us from using a regression discontinuity design.
3.2 Empirical strategy
The hiring credit can inuence employment through its impact on hires and on separations.
To see this, let us consider the law of motion of employment which determines the level of
employment at the end of the current period
L = L 1 +H   S; (1)
where L 1 stands for employment inherited from the previous period, H denotes the number of
entries and S is the number of separations.
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Hiring credits aim at increasing employment through their e¤ect on hires. However, it is
possible that rms benet from important amounts of hiring credits while the e¤ects on net
employment are negligible. Becker (2010) and Posner (2010), reacting to the Hiring Incentives
to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act passed in the US in 2010, argued that it will increase
churning and wages with very little e¤ect on employment. This reasoning is in line with that
of new-keynesian macroeconomists who claim that employment subsidies are ine¤ective during
recessions because low employment is the consequence of an insu¢ cient aggregate demand (Gali,
2013). If low employment is the consequence of an insu¢ cient demand for the products of the
rms, hiring credits can induce rms to re some employees, and then replace them with workers
for whom they can collect the subsidy. The main impact of the hiring credit may thus be to
increase churning and wages with very little e¤ect on employment. In our context, churning
is potentially an important concern to the extent that worker ows in excess of those strictly
necessary to achieve a given change in employment are large in France (Abowd et al., 1999).
If the hiring credit increases employment, it is nevertheless possible that its impact on hours
worked is limited, because rms have incentives to substitute hours of subsidized employees for
those of non subsidized employees. Therefore, it is also important to analyze the response of
hours of work.
In what follows, we estimate the impact of the hiring credit on employment, wages, hours
of work, hires and separations. We analyze yearly cohorts of rms. We select, for each cohort
t, rms whose size criteria in year t   1 is around the cut-o¤ (that is 10 full-time-equivalent
employees, calculated at the average of end-of-month pro-rata temporis headcounts between
January and November of year t  1) and estimate the following di¤erence-in-di¤erences model:
Yit = + Zit + Dit + ZitDit +Xitb+ uit (2)
where Yit is the outcome of rm i in period t, Zit an eligibility dummy equal to 1 if the rm size
in period t   1 is below 10, Dit a dummy for year 2009 when subsidies can be claimed, Xit a
vector of covariates.  is our parameter of interest. It captures the di¤erential evolution of the
group targeted by the hiring credit. It can be interpreted as an Intention-To-Treat parameter.
Accordingly, we refer, from now on, to rms with less than 10 employees in year t   1 as our
"treatment" group, even if they do not claim the hiring credit. Note that by dening our
eligibility dummy for every year, the treatment e¤ect estimate is robust to potential mean-
reversion bias that could occur if the denitions of the control and treatment groups were based
12
on the size of rms in 2008 only.
In the benchmark estimations, the bandwidth goes from 6 (included) to 14 (excluded) full
time employees in the previous year. In Table 1, we report characteristics of our 2009 cohort.
These characteristics are measured in 2008. In the rst three columns, we compare small and
medium size rms. Small (i.e. eligible) rms operate less frequently in manufacturing industry
and slightly more often in retail, transport and merchant services than non-eligible medium size
rms. They are slightly more frequently located in the Parisian area and the South-Eastern
part of France, and less frequently in the North West part of France. Almost half of small rms
have sales of less than 2 million euros, while one medium-size rm out of four exceeds that
mark. Small rms are also younger: 13 percent have existed for less than 5 years vs. 10 percent
for medium-size rms. The composition of the workforce (in 2008) di¤ers between small and
medium rms. Small rms have more white collar employees, while medium rms have more
blue collar workers. Finally, the share of low-paid workers and that of part-time workers are
both higher in small rms. These variables are included in the regressions to control for these
di¤erences.
4 Results
We now turn to our main results on the e¤ect of the hiring credit on employment, hours worked,
wages, hires and separations. These results allow us to evaluate the cost per job created and the
windfalls for rms. Since we nd that the windfalls represent a very large share of the total cost
of the hiring credit, we explore the consequence of alternative hiring credit schemes conditional
on net job creation. Various robustness checks are presented in the next section.
4.1 Employment and hours
The validity of di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations is heavily dependent on the common trend
assumption. We describe the common trend for treated rms with previous size between 6 and
10 (excluded) and control rms with previous size from 10 to 14 in Figure 5. The outcome
is average employment growth in each group.15 Employment is computed at the rm level.
15We focus on the e¤ect of the hiring credit on the growth rate of employment rather than on the employment
level for the following reason. The common trend assumption on the employment level requires identical di¤erences
in employment levels between year t and year t   1 for the control and the treatment group before 2009, i.e.
LCt   LCt 1 = LTt   LTt 1 where Ljt stands for average employment of group j (j = C for the control group and
j = T for the treatment group) in year t < 2009: We checked that this assumption is not fullled. This is
13
Employment in year t is equal to employment on 30 November of year t. This ensures that
employment in 2008 is not inuenced by the hiring credit that was announced on 4 December
2008. Let Li;t denote employment in rm i on 30 November of year t; average employment
growth for each group is 1Nt
P
i
Li;t Li;t 1
Li;t 1 where Nt is the number of rms in the group. Figure
5 shows that the di¤erence in employment growth rates between the treatment group and the
control group is negative and constant from 2006 to 2008. In 2009, this di¤erence becomes
positive: the growth rate of the treatment group drops by 0.9 percentage points while that of
the control group drops by 1.6 percentage points.16 Figure 6 shows that the same phenomenon
arises for hours of work: the average growth rate of total hours of work per rm of the treatment
group is below that of the control group from 2006 to 2008 and becomes larger than that of the
control group in 2009. This points to positive treatment e¤ects, that we estimate below.
In Table 2, we present our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes (in rows)
and specications (in columns). In column 1, our baseline sample comprises all cohorts from
2006 to 2009 without covariates. In column 2, we add covariates control. In column 3, we
restrict the sample to cohorts 2008 and 2009 (to avoid potential specication errors related to
underlying trends). The results are very stable. They indicate that the hiring credit increased
the employment growth rate of the treatment group by about 0.8 percentage points (column 2,
line 4 of Table 2). Table 2 shows that the impact of the hiring credit on the growth of hours of
work is similar to that on employment, indicating that rms did not reduce working hours on
existing jobs to compensate for new hires. The last row of Table 2 shows that the hiring credit
had no impact on the survival of rms, meaning that the hiring credit raised employment in
surviving rms. Indeed, estimates on the subsample of surviving rms are identical to that of
all rms, as shown in Table 15 in appendix.17
not surprising inasmuch as the impact of productivity shocks or labor costs shocks on the employment level are
expected to increase with the size of the rm. This is the case, for instance, when the wage elasticity of labor
demand is constant. To see this, consider a simple static model, where the production function is F (L) and
the labor cost is equal to the net wage w times the labor wedge : The optimal level of employment satises
F 0(L) = w: This equation implies that a one percent change in labor cost induces a change in employment level
that is proportional to the initial employment level of the rm, i.e. dL = L"d=; where " = F 0(L)=LF 00(L)
denotes the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the labor cost w.
16The average employment growth is negative for the treatment group and the control group all along the
period. This is because new entrants, which typically account for a signicant share of employment growth, are
excluded from the sample. Bear in mind that, by construction, we cannot include new entrants since we study
the behavior of rms that had between 6 and 14 full time equivalent employees the previous year.
17Our estimates are not weighted by rm size. This could bias our results if, for instance, the elasticity of labor
demand depends on the size of rms. We checked that estimates provided in the course of the paper yield results
similar to weighted estimates. This is illustrated by Table 16 in appendix which shows the weighted estimates
corresponding to those displayed Table in 2.
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Figure 5: Average employment growth rate in rms in the treated and control groups.
Note: Growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t  1 and year t. The treatment group
comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in previous
year (average from 1 December to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10
(included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in previous year (average from 1 December
to 30 November).
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Figure 6: Average hours growth rate in rms in the treated and control groups.
Note: Growth rate of the number of hours worked within each rm between November of year t and
November of year t   1. The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10
(excluded) full time equivalent employees in previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November).
The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November).
16
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
2009m1 2009m4 2009m7 2009m10
time
Difference-in-differences estimate 95 % Conf. Int.
Figure 7: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring subsidy on the employ-
ment growth rate.
Note: The outcome is (Lm;t Lt 1)=Lt 1 where Lm;t denotes employment at the end of month m of
year t and Lt 1 employment on 30 November of year t   1: Estimations include years and covariates
presented in Table 2, column 2.
Table 3 displays separately the impact of the hiring credit on eligible jobs  jobs paying
below 1.6 times the minimum wage that last at least one month and on ineligible jobs.18 The
hiring credit has a strong positive and signicant impact on employment and hours for eligible
jobs only. The impact for non eligible jobs is rather positive, but not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. This means that the hiring credit has had a positive impact on total employment and total
hours mainly through its impact on eligible jobs, and very marginally on ineligible jobs.
Our data set allows us to show the evolution of employment month-by-month over the year
2009. Figure 7 displays the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for the e¤ect on employment month
by month over the year 2009. The estimated impact of the hiring credit increases steadily over
the year. The same is true for hours worked, as shown on Figure 8. In line with the literature
on dynamic labor demand, our results indicate that employment may react quickly to shocks on
labor costs, with a delay that is clearly infra annual (Hamermesh, 2013).
18The number of observations in Table 3 is smaller than in Table 2 because there are rms without jobs either
below or above 1.6 times the minimum wage. The last column of Table 3 displays the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimates for all jobs with this smaller sample. Results are identical to those displayed in Table 2, corresponding
to the full sample comprising rms without jobs either below or above 1.6 times the minimum wage.
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Figure 8: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring subsidy on the growth
rate of hours of work.
Note: The outcome is (hm;t   ht 1)=ht 1 where hm;t denotes hours of work in month m of year t and
ht 1 hours of work in November of year t   1: Estimations include years and covariates presented in
Table 2, column 2.
Since the hiring credit decreased the total labor cost of rms of the treatment group by 0.2
percent19 and increased total employment by 0.8 percent, our estimates point to an employment
elasticity with respect to the change in labor cost induced by the hiring credit of around  4;
belonging to the 95% condence interval [ 6; 2].
The strong employment impact of zero charges relies on the absence of wage increases and on
the absence of increased churning of workers, as shown below. Even if wages and labor turnover
did not increase, this gure may at rst sight seem incredibly high, compared to usual estimates
of labor demand elasticities. For instance, Kramarz and Philippon (2001) and Abowd et al.
(2006) found that the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage is about  2
for men and  1:5 for women in France. Crepon and Desplatz (2001), using a di¤erent empirical
strategy, found an elasticity equal to  0:8 for all workers.
It is important to remark, however, that the strong employment impact of zéro charges
19 In November 2009, rms in the treatment group got 3.6 million euros from zéro charges while their labor
cost during that month was 1.75 billion euros, which corresponds to a decrease of 0.21% in labor cost. Over the
course of year 2009, zéro charges decreased the labor cost of rms in the treatment group by 0.14%. The amount
of subsidies paid by zéro charges increased progressively during 2009.
18
relies on the fact that a temporary decrease in average labor cost can have stronger employment
e¤ects when it is induced by a hiring credit than by wage changes that apply to all employees. To
show this, let " stand for the elasticity of contemporaneous employment, L; when the change in
average labor cost per worker is due to a temporary change in the wage cost w of all incumbent
and entrant workers. This is the standard denition of labor demand elasticity when the payroll
equals wL: Let " stand for the elasticity of employment with respect to the average labor cost
per worker when the change in average labor cost per worker is due to zéro charges. Bear in
mind that the hiring credit alters the cost of entrants (i.e. new hires) only. The relation between
employment and hires is given by the law of motion of employment (1). Let us assume that " is
identical in all rms and that the hiring credit does not increase churning of workers and wages,
which is the case for zéro charges as shown below. We get (see appendix A.2):
" = " (3)
where  = H=L is the average hiring rate of rms with a positive number of hires eligible to
zéro charges.20 As long as  < 1, the employment elasticity induced by the hiring credit is
larger, in absolute value, than that induced by a proportional change in the wage cost of all
workers. The reason is that subsidizing the jobs of incumbent workers in rms that recruit has
no employment e¤ects: all it does is to create windfalls for rms. Using hiring credits is a means
to target subsidies at marginal jobs, that have positive employment e¤ects, without providing
subsidies to incumbent workers, which has no employment e¤ects. In the limit case where  = 1;
the two elasticities are identical because the entire workforce of rms that benet from the hiring
credit is subsidized.
All in all, we nd that "; the elasticity of employment with respect to labor cost induced
by a change in wage, is smaller, in absolute value, than when the labor cost is modied by the
hiring credit. The 95% interval condence of the elasticity " is [ 3:6;  1:2],21 which is in line
with previous estimates obtained for France.
20Note that the hiring rate  is dened here as the ratio of the number of hires over employment, i.e. H=L;
whereas the hiring rate is dened as H=L 1 in the rest of the paper.
21The hiring rate is computed over the period during which zéro charges was implemented (i.e. from 4 December
2008 to 30 November 2009). It amounts to 0:63 which implies that " =  4 0:63 =  2:52 with a 95% condence
interval equal to [ 3:6; 1:2].
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4.2 Wages
The hiring credit may raise individual net wages. It may also induce rms to hire workers with
fewer skills at lower wages, since the hiring credit decreases with the wage as shown on Figure
1. To evaluate the impact of the hiring credit on wages, we use our di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach, where the dependent variable is the di¤erence in log wages.22 Let wit be the average
hourly wage of workers in rm i in year t and ~wit 1 their average hourly wage in the previous
year (if they worked), either in rm i; or in any other rm. Workers who did not work in the
previous year are excluded. For each rm i and year t; the dependent variable is lnwit  ln ~wit 1
for all workers present in rm i on 30 November of year t: This variable allows us to compare the
evolution of wage changes in small and medium rms controlling for individual past wages. If
the hiring credit did indeed have an impact on wages, that should be apparent for the entrants
eligible for the hiring credit i.e. workers hired during the current year, paid below 1.6 times the
minimum wage, and who worked in the rm at least one month. Figure 9 shows the evolution
of the wages of these workers in the small and medium rms over the years 2006-2009. Contrary
to what we see for employment and hours of work, there is no break in the common trend in
2009. This suggests that the hiring credit had no impact on wages. This is conrmed by Table 4
which displays the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for the wages of all workers, for the wages
of incumbent workers paid below 1.6 times the minimum wage, and for the wages of entrants
eligible for the hiring credit. In all cases, the estimates point to a null e¤ect of the hiring credit
on wages. This result is not surprising in the French context, where there is a high minimum
wage and collective agreements that are most often binding for small rms and that cover more
than 90 percent of employees.
4.3 Churning and separations
Table 2 shows that the hiring credit has a positive, although non-signicant, impact on the
separation rate. Consistent with this result, the hiring credit has a bigger impact on the hiring
rate than on employment growth, although the di¤erence is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
It may be suspected that this result reects some strategic behavior of rms which might replace
incumbent workers with new workers to benet from the hiring credit.
Let us provide evidence which suggests that this is not the case. Using French data over
22Note that although the DADS is not a panel, it does provide the wage in the previous year for each worker.
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Figure 9: Average log wage di¤erence of entrants eligible for the hiring credit in rms in the
treated and control groups.
Note: Eligible entrants are workers hired during the current year, paid below 1.6 times the minimum
wage and who worked at least one month in the rm. The average log wage di¤erence for each group is
1
Ni
P
i lnwit  ln ~wit 1 where wit is the average hourly wage of eligible entrants in rm i in year t and
~wit 1 their average hourly wage in the previous year, if they worked, either in rm i; or in any other rm;
Ni is the number of rms in the group. The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30
November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time
equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November).
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the period 1987-1990, Abowd et al. (1999) estimate that each job created in a given year is
associated with 3 hires and 2 separations. Davis et al. (2012) also nd that hires rise more
than one-for-one with job creation in the US. This relation indicates that a higher incidence of
recently formed matches at more rapidly growing rms generates higher separation rates. There
are two reasons for this. One is purely mechanical: at given quit rate, the separation rate,
equal to the number of separations during the period divided by employment at the beginning
of the period (or by the average of employment at the beginning and at the end of the period),
increases when employment grows faster. Another reason ows from the fact that lling a job
requires nding the right match with the right worker, which is not always the case with the
rst hire. Accordingly, if the hiring credit fosters job creation, it may also increase churning,
even in the case where rms to do not strategically raise their separations in order to hire new
workers at lower cost.23
The upper chart of Figure 10 shows the relation between the hiring rate and the employment
growth rate in small-size and medium-size rms over the period 2006-2008. The vertical axis
displays the average annual hiring rate24 by growth rate bins. Hires increase more than one-for-
one with job creation in all rms. Over the period 2006-2008, the relation between hires and
employment growth is similar in small-size and in medium-size rms.
If the hiring credit had induced employers to replace incumbent workers with new workers
to benet from the subsidy in 2009, the hiring rate, at a given employment growth rate, would
have been higher in small rms, eligible for the hiring credit, than it was in medium-size rms
not eligible for the hiring credit. The bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that this is not the case.
The relation between hires and employment growth is similar in small-size and medium-size
rms before and after 2009. This means that the hiring credit did not induce rms to increase
labor turnover in order to benet from the subsidy.
4.4 Heterogeneous e¤ects
The employment e¤ect of the hiring credit may di¤er across sectors and regions depending on
local labor market conditions. Where it is particularly di¢ cult to recruit, hiring costs should be
higher and the hiring credit might not be enough to boost employment.
23Assume that each hire induces s separations. If s remains constant, the separation rate, dened as S=L 1
increases with H: This is also the case if the separation rate is dened as 2S=(L+L 1), as in Davis et al. (1996).
24The hiring rate of year t is the number of hires from 1 December of year t 1 to 30 November of year t divided
by employment on 30 November of year t  1:
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Figure 10: Hiring rate and employment growth rate in small size and medium size rms.
Note: The upper chart displays the average of the mean hiring rate by employment growth rate bins
over 2006-2008. The bottom chart displays the average hiring rate by employment growth rate bins in
2009. Dots represent 6-bin moving averages. Small size rms have 6-10 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year. Medium size rms have 10-14 full time equivalent employees in the
previous year. Source: DADS.
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To check for the possibility of heterogeneous employment e¤ects across regions and sectors,
we use a survey carried out on recruitment shortages (survey Besoins de Main dOeuvre - BMO).
The survey comprises information on recruitment di¢ culties in 388 local employment pools and
24 sectors; each year it supplies 8,622 estimates (some industries are not always present in all
employment pools). Every year, rms are requested to provide, for the coming year, the number
of recruitments they foresee, and how many of these recruitment projects are considered di¢ cult
(see appendix A.5 for a detailed presentation of this source). The di¢ culties are self-assessed
and merely expected, not realized. This source allows us to calculate the percentage of di¢ cult
hiring plans at the sector-areas level. The resulting estimates of hiring di¢ culties are then
matched with the DADS based on the employment pool and industry to which rms belong.
This matched database is used to evaluate the inuence of hiring di¢ culties on the e¤ects of
the hiring credit. To this end, we estimate the di¤erence-in-di¤erences model (2) separately for
the four quartiles of the hiring di¢ culties distribution. To control for the potential endogeneity
of hiring di¢ culties in 2009, the share of di¢ cult hires in 2009 is instrumented by the average
share of di¢ cult hires in 2006-2008 (at a time when the hiring credit was not yet implemented).
Table 5 presents the estimates by quartile of hiring di¢ culties. It shows that the employment
e¤ect decreases when recruitment di¢ culties increase. The di¤erences across quartiles are large.
There are no signicant employment e¤ects in the quartile with the greatest amount of di¢ culty
in hiring, while the e¤ect is very large and signicant in the quartile with the least amount of
hiring di¢ culty.25 This suggests that the hiring credit is not e¤ective at creating jobs in sectors
and areas where workers are hard to nd. This might be the case, for instance, in booming
areas and sectors, or when there is a permanent lack of suitable manpower. This might also
be more frequently the case in booms than in recessions, suggesting that hiring credits may be
more e¤ective at boosting employment when the economy slows down.
5 Cost analysis
5.1 Cost per job created and windfalls for rms
Based on our estimates, it is possible to compute the gross cost per job created in the treatment
group. The zéro charges hiring credit provided 3:6 million euros to the rms of the treatment
25Note that these di¤erences do not rely on di¤erences in the share of eligible hires that beneted from the
hiring credit (the attention rate) since the correlation between hiring di¢ culties and the attention rate is close
to zero, equal to 0.0198.
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group in November 2009 and created about 5; 200 jobs at that date.26 Accordingly, at the end
of 2009, the monthly cost of job creation amounts to 700 euros (about 25% of the average cost of
a job in the treatment group).27 This is gross cost, because it ignores the savings generated by
job creation in terms of unemployment and other social benets that would have been paid in
the absence of the measure. It also ignores the remaining social contributions paid by employees
on these additional jobs. We exploit a survey, presented in appendix A.6, which allows us to
precisely evaluate the savings permitted by zéro charges on social benets. To this end we rely
on two key assumptions. First, consistent with our estimation of the impact of zéro charges
on net job creation, we assume that the number of jobs created by zéro charges reduced non-
employment by the same amount. Second, we assume that social benets would have been paid
to individuals identical to the beneciaries of zéro charges if they had remained on the dole.
We nd that the savings amount to about 700 euros per month. This makes the net cost of the
hiring credit per created job equal to zero.
There are however large windfalls for rms associated with the hiring credit. Let ~H denote
the number of hires subsidized by zéro charges and H the number of hires created by zéro
charges. The share of hires that have beneted from the hiring credit and that would have
been created absent the hiring credit amounts to ( ~H  H)= ~H: According to our estimates, 84
percent of the hires subsidized by zéro charges would have occurred absent the hiring credit.28
This large share implies that rms have beneted from important windfalls associated with zéro
charges.
5.2 Evaluation of the impact of hiring credits conditional on net job creation
Given the large windfalls for rms entailed by zéro charges, it is worth looking at alternative
schemes that aim at reducing the cost of hiring credits. Many schemes rely on credits conditional
on net job creation. In order to shed light on the di¤erences in the e¤ects of credits conditional on
net job creation and hiring credits without this condition, we rely on the model of labor demand
with hiring and ring costs presented in appendix A.1. This model allows us to compare the
26As shown by table 14, there are 646; 717 jobs in the treatment group at the end of 2008. According to table
2 our estimate of coe¢ cient  when the dependent variable is L=L 1 in equation (2), equals 0:008. Thus, the
number of jobs created in the treatment group is 0:008 646; 717 = 5; 173:
27700 euros are equal to 3:6 106=5; 200.
28There are 48; 992 subsidized hires in the treatment group in 2009. According to Table 2, the hiring credit,
which increased the hiring rate H=L 1 by 1:2 percent, created 7; 760 (equal to 0:012 646; 717) additional hires,
since there are 646; 717 jobs in the treatment group at the end of 2008, as shown by Table 14.
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impact of the two schemes when the hiring credit  per eligible hire is identical for both schemes.
It shows that (see appendix A.3):
1. When the hiring credit is non-conditional on net job creation:
(a) In rms where ring costs and hiring costs are su¢ ciently low, the hiring credit
induces employers to lay o¤ incumbent workers in order to replace them by subsidized
workers.
(b) In rms where ring or hiring costs are su¢ ciently high, the hiring credit does not
induce layo¤s in order to hire subsidized workers.
2. When the credit is conditional on net employment growth, its impact on hires and em-
ployment is the same as that of the hiring credit non-conditional on net job creation in
rms which are in the case 1b above and which benet from the conditional hiring credit
(i.e. for rms for which growth is high enough to benet from the credit).
Since our empirical evaluation concludes that zéro charges, which is a hiring credit non-
conditional on net job creation, did not induce rms to lay workers o¤ in order to hire subsidized
workers, we evaluate the potential impact of credits conditional on net job creation assuming
that case 1b applies. This allows us to compute the labor demand elasticity with respect to the
labor cost when the change in labor cost is induced by the credit conditional on net job creation
above the employment growth threshold .29 From the knowledge of this elasticity, denoted by
" ; and from the knowledge of the labor demand elasticity with respect to the labor cost when
the change in labor cost is induced by the non-conditional hiring credit, denoted by ";30 we
can compute the number of jobs created by each type of credit for an expenditure equal to one
percent of the labor cost. We assume that the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the
wage, "; is identical for all rms and that the take-up rate of eligible hires is identical for both
types of credit. Then, the ratio of the number of jobs created by the credit conditional on net
job creation above the employment growth threshold  over the number of jobs created by the
non-conditional hiring credit is equal to31
"
"
= 
1 +  ()
 ()   ; (4)
29 see equation (A13) in appendix A.4.
30 see equation (A11) in appendix A.2.
31 see the denitions of the two elasticities equations (A11) and (A13) in appendix A.2 and A.4 respectively.
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where  () is the average employment growth rate of rms that grow above the threshold 
absent the subsidy, and  is the average hiring rate of rms with a positive number of hires
eligible to the non-conditional hiring credit.
The "=" ratio can be smaller or larger than one. It is smaller than one if the non-conditional
hiring credit is relatively e¤ective. This comes about if the hiring rate of rms subsidized by the
non-conditional hiring credit is small (i.e.  small) and if the conditional credit targets rms
that would have had high employment growth absent the hiring credit (i.e.  ()   large). In
this situation, the conditional credit creates large windfalls for rms, because it targets rms
that would have created many jobs absent the hiring credit.
The "=" ratio can either increase or decrease with : When  increases, the conditional
credit targets rms that would have created more jobs absent the subsidy, i.e.  0() > 0. But
the impact of increases in  on the term [1 +  ()] = [ ()  ] depends on the shape of the
conditional average  ().32
Figure 11 displays the "=" ratio computed on the treatment group for various values of
the growth threshold : The ratio is bigger than one, meaning that the credit conditional on
net job creation is more e¤ective at creating jobs than the non-conditional hiring credit. This
means that the credit conditional on net job creation would reduce the windfalls for rms.
Figure 11 also shows that the credit conditional on net job creation would create a maximum
number of jobs when the employment growth rate threshold  equals  1%. In that case, the
credit conditional on net job creation would create 4.4 times more jobs, at given budget, than
the non-conditional hiring credit.
These results suggest that it might have been worthwhile to target the credit at net job
creation and provide more generous subsidies per job created to fewer rms. However, this
conclusion needs further investigation because credits conditional on net job creation are much
more complex to implement than non-conditional hiring credits. This implies that the take-up
rate might be signicantly lower with credits conditional on net job creation. Moreover, since
rms do not know with certainty when they hire workers if they will reach the threshold above
which they become eligible when credits are conditional on net job creation, their impact might
be smaller than that of non-conditional hiring credits.
32The derivative of [1 +  ()] = [ ()  ] with respect to  has the same sign as the expression 1+ ()  (+
1) 0(); where    1 and  () > :
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Figure 11: Ratio of the number of jobs created by the credit conditional on net job creation
above the employment growth threshold  over the number of jobs created by the non-conditional
hiring credit.
Note: The horizontal axis displays the employment growth rate threshold  above which rms are eligible
for the credit conditional on net job creation.
6 Robustness checks
In this section we perform a number of additional estimations to check the robustness of our
baseline results. We vary the bandwidth. We run placebo tests to conrm the validity of the
common trend assumption and rule out the possibility that our estimates are driven by reversion
to the mean. We also control for any potential equilibrium e¤ect that could bias our previous
estimates.
6.1 Changing the bandwidth
Our benchmark estimates are based on a sample which includes some treated rms featuring a
lower take-up than others (between 8 and 10 employees), and a residual take-up among control
rms (between 10 and 12 employees, see Figure 4). Table 6 presents the estimates for di¤er-
ent bandwidths. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates are higher when the treatment group
includes rms with higher take-up rates (column 1 to 3). Column 4 shows that the estimates
are also higher when the control group excludes rms with residual take-up. This suggests that
our benchmark estimates, which rely on rms that have from 6 to 14 full time equivalent em-
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ployees in the previous year, are lower bounds of the impact of the subsidy. The corresponding
estimates of elasticity of employment with respect to the change in labor cost induced by zéro
charges equal  5:5 and  7:5 when the bandwidth goes from 5 to 15 employees and falls in the
range [5,8]-[13,16] employees respectively.33 All in all, these results suggest that our benchmark
estimate of the elasticity of employment with respect to the change in labor cost induced by
the hiring credit is conservative: it is likely a lower bound for the elasticity that might be larger
than 4 in absolute value.
6.2 Year placebo tests
We perform a series of placebo tests using cohorts from 2006 to 2008. We use the specication
of column 3 in Table 2 as if the policy had been implemented in December 2006 (using cohorts
2006 and 2007) or December 2007 (using cohorts 2006, 2007 and 2008). Table 7 shows that
employment, hours, hires and separations of the treatment and the control groups did not evolve
di¤erently either in 2007 or in 2008, contrary to 2009 when zéro charges was introduced. Figures
12 and 13, which display the month-by-month di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for employment
in year 2007 (if the shock had been in December 2006) and in year 2008 (if the shock had been
in December 2007) respectively, show that the month-by-month evolution of employment was
similar in the control and the treatment groups over these 2 years. These results reinforce the
relevance of the common trend assumption. They also rule out the possibility that our estimates
of the impact of zéro charges are driven by reversion to the mean.
6.3 Size threshold placebo tests
A potential concern is that our results may reect the fact that rms of di¤erent sizes behave
di¤erently during the business cycle, especially at the beginning of recessions. Moscarini and
Postel Vinay (2012) have shown that large rms (above 500 employees) destroy proportionally
more jobs in net terms relative to small rms (below 20 employees) when unemployment is
above trend in France. This phenomenon is not necessarily a concern in our case, because
the di¤erence in the rm size in our control and treatment groups is very small compared to
the situation studied by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay. Nevertheless, we check that there is no
systematic di¤erence in the evolution of employment and hours across rms of di¤erent size in
33As explained in footnote 21 these elasticities imply labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage equal to
 3:5 =  5:5 0:63 and  4:7 =  7:5 0:63 respectively.
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Figure 12: Placebo test as if the policy had been implemented in December 2006.
Note: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring subsidy if the subsidy had been
introduced in December 2006. The outcome is the growth rate of employment (Lm;t Lt 1)=Lt 1 where
Lm;t denotes employment at the end of month m of year t and Lt 1 employment on 30 November of
year t  1: Estimations include years 2006-2007 and covariates presented in table 2.
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Figure 13: Placebo test as if the policy had been implemented in December 2007.
Note: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring subsidy if the subsidy had been
introduced in December 2007. The outcome is the growth rate of employment (Lm;t Lt 1)=Lt 1 where
Lm;t denotes employment at the end of month m of year t and Lt 1 employment on 30 November of
year t  1: Estimations include years 2006-2008 and covariates presented in table 2.
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Figure 14: Average employment growth rates in placebo groups.
Note: Growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t  1 and year t. One group comprises
rms of size between 13 (included) and 16 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year
(average from 1 December to 30 November). The other group comprises rms of size from 16 (included)
to 19 full time equivalent employees in the previous year.
2009.
If rms of size between 6 and 10 employees in 2008 behaved di¤erently in 2009 from rms
of size between 10 to 14 employees because of di¤erences in size and not because of the hiring
credit, we would expect rms with 13 to 16 employees to behave di¤erently from rms with
16 to 19 employees.34 Figure 14 compares the average employment growth rate for rms with
13 to 16 (excluded) employees in previous year and rms with 16 to 19 employees in previous
year. The di¤erence in employment growth across these groups does not change in 2009. This
result is conrmed by the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for these two groups of rms.35 This
indicates that the di¤erence in employment growth across our treatment and control groups does
not stem from di¤erences in behavior due to di¤erences in size.
34We avoid to make comparisons using rms with 10 to 12 employees in previous year which, for a tiny fraction,
have beneted from the subsidy as shown by gure 4.
35We do not present these estimates to save space. The results are available upon request.
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6.4 Equilibrium e¤ects
The validity of di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations relies on the assumption that the control
group is not a¤ected by the policy. In our context, it is possible that rms above 10 employees
may have been impacted by the hiring credit. The control group can be a¤ected negatively.
The hiring credit could provide competitive advantage to small rms that expand their market
share at the expense of larger rms. The supplementary hires induced by the hiring credit might
increase labor market tightness and thus the recruiting costs for all rms. Firms of the control
group can also be impacted positively. The rise in production of small rms could increase the
demand directed at their suppliers. The lower labor cost might allow small rms to sell their
products at a lower price, boosting the production of rms that buy these products. All these
mechanisms imply a potential impact of the hiring credit on employment and hours worked of
the control group that can be either positive of negative.
To deal with this issue, we check whether employment and hours worked of the control
group have been impacted by the share of subsidized hires in their employment pool and in
their sector. If there are equilibrium e¤ects that reduce the impact of the hiring credit, we
should observe lower growth rates of employment or hours among non-eligible rms in areas
with a higher share of subsidized hires. We distinguish 348 employment pools,36 and 5 sectors
(manufacturing, construction, retail and transport, hotels and restaurants, and other merchant
services) and we restrict our sample to employment pool  sector units with at least 50 rms
present in a given year. We rst check that our baseline results remain unchanged if we regress
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences equation (2) on the sample made of the employment pool  sector
units obtained this way. To do so, for each unit and each year we compute the average growth
rates of employment and hours worked separately for the two groups of rms (treatment or
control). We weight each employment pool  sector unit by its employment size among rms
with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. The results are shown in
Table 8. They are similar to those in Table 2.
Within each of the 1,512 employment pool  sector units obtained for 2009, we compute
the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 to all hires observed in 2008 among rms with 0 to 14 full
36We use the 348 zones demploi provided by INSEE, the French national statistical o¢ ce. A zone demploi
is a geographic area wherein most workers reside and work, and in which companies can nd most of the labor
needed for the jobs o¤ered. The denition of zone demploi is based on the ow of commuting workers observed
in the 2006 Census.
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time equivalent employees in 2008, denoted Sjk, where j stands for the employment pool and
k for the sector. We also compute for each unit the average growth rate of employment and
of hours worked from December 2008 to November 2009 among rms having from 10 to 14 full
time equivalent employees in the previous year. The average ratio of subsidized hires in 2009
among rms with 0 to 14 employees, Sjk; is 0:210, and its standard deviation is 0:087. We then
compare the labor market outcomes across units with di¤erent shares of subsidized hires. To
achieve this, we estimate the following model :
Yjk = + 1Sjk + 2Sj( k) + 3S( j)k + bXjk + ujk (5)
where Yjk stands for the average growth rate of employment or of hours worked in rms belonging
to employment pool j and sector k, Sj( k) is the number of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by
all hires in 2008 in rms with 0 to 14 employees operating in employment pool j and belonging to
sectors other than k; and S( j)k is the number of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by all hires in
2008 in rms with 0 to 14 employees operating in employment pools other than j but belonging
to sector k. The term ujk is a residual. In this setting Sjk and Sj( k) together account for the
equilibrium e¤ects that may occur within the employment pool j whatever the sector, while
S( j)k accounts for the equilibrium e¤ects that could arise from interactions with rms in the
same sector as the unit under consideration but outside the employment pool j: We also include
a number of unit-specic controls Xjk, such as the distribution of rm age, the composition of
the workforce, as well as the growth rate of employment, and the hiring rates in the employment
pool in 2008. The aim is to achieve a better control for the specicities of labor market dynamics
in each pool. To better account for the labor market situation, the set of control varaibles Xjk
also includes the change in the survival rate of rms within the unit between 2008 and 2009,
as well as the employment growth rate in 2009 observed in the same sector as the unit but in
employment zones located nearby. If the sum of coe¢ cients  is signicantly di¤erent from zero,
this indicates the presence of equilibrium e¤ects.
Now, the number of subsidized hires in 2009 might be a¤ected by unobserved shocks that also
a¤ect employment and hours of the control group, meaning that the ratios S of subsidized hires
in 2009 are potentially endogenous in equation (5). For this reason, in each employment pool
 sector unit, the ratios S of subsidized hires in 2009 are instrumented by the corresponding
shares of eligible hires in 2008 among all hires the same year (when the subsidy was not yet
implemented). This amounts to substituting the number of subsidized hires in 2009 at the
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numerator of S by the number of eligible hires in 2008 in rms with less than 10 employees. The
resulting instruments are denoted Z:
Table 9 presents the result for the OLS estimation of equation (5). It shows that there is no
statistically signicant correlation between the share of subsidized hires and the average growth
rates of employment and hours in 2009, when estimations include the set of controls. Tables
10 and 11 show the estimates when the share of subsidized hires in 2009 is instrumented by
the share of eligible hires in 2008, both for the growth rate of employment and that of hours.
Table 10 presents the rst step of the estimations. It shows that the shares of subsidized hires
in 2009 are strongly correlated with the instruments Z. Table 11 shows the second step of the
estimations. No signicant equilibrium e¤ects are detected, even when the full set of controls is
included in the regression. For the specication using controls, the Wu-Hausman endogeneity
test suggests that the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 is not a valid instrument, either when
the dependent variable is the growth rate of employment in 2009 or when it is the growth rate
of hours. In that case the estimates based on the OLS are more relevant. These results remain
unchanged if we enlarge our sample to all employment pool  sector units with at least 30, or
if we restrict it to units with at least 100 rms in 2009 (instead of 50).
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that a hiring credit targeted at small rms and low wage workers did have a
signicant impact on employment in France during the 2008-2009 recession. The hiring credit,
although non-conditional on net job creation, did not induce rms to increase layo¤s in order
to hire workers at lower cost. These results are consistent with a standard neoclassical labor
demand model with hiring and ring costs and exogenous wage.
All in all, the hiring credit was very e¤ective. It allowed the government to create jobs
at zero net cost in a small amount of time. Our results suggest that the e¤ectiveness of the
hiring credit relied on the excess of labor supply during the recession, which implied that hiring
di¢ culties were not stringent for a large share of rms. The low cost of job creation is also
linked to the temporary nature of the hiring credit which allows the government to lower the
cost of entrants but not that of incumbent workers. To the extent that employment adjusted
quickly to the drop in labor cost, it is likely that the hiring credit had a temporary impact on
employment, that disappeared at least in part when the hiring credit was terminated. However,
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this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, because the information is not yet available to study
the evolution of employment after the end of zéro charges.
It should be kept in mind that our results have been obtained in a specic context. In
particular, the zéro charges program was targeted at low wages, which are very rigid in France,
because the minimum wage is very high and almost all workers are covered by sectoral collective
agreements that are binding on small rms. It is likely that the strong wage rigidity contributed
to the positive employment impact of zéro charges, meaning that permanent hiring credits, or
hiring credits not targeted at low wages, could have a much weaker employment impact.
35
References
Abowd, J., Corbel, P. and Kramarz, F. 1999. The Entry and Exit of Workers and the Growth
of Employment, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 81(2), pp.170-187.
Abowd, J., Kramarz, F. Margolis, D. and Philippon, T. 2006. The Tail of Two Countries:
Minimum Wage and Employment in France and the United-States, Crest working paper.
Angrist, , J. 1996, The short-run demand for Palestinian labor, Journal of Labor Economics,
vol 14(3), pp. 425-53.
Barlet, M., Blanchet, D. and Le Barbanchon, T. 2009. Microsimulation et modèles dagents:
une approche alternative pour lévaluation des politiques demploi, Economie et Statistique,
Programme National Persée, vol. 429(1), pp. 51-76.
Becker, G. 2010. Subsidies to Small Business?, www.becker-posner-blog.com.
Bennmarker, H., Mellander, E. and Öckert, B. 2009. Do regional payroll tax reductions boost
employment?, Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pp. 480-489, October.
Bishop, J. H. 1981. Employment in construction and distribution industries: The impact of
the New Jobs Tax Credit. In S. Rosen (Ed.), Studies in labor markets (pp. 209-46). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Cahuc, P., Carcillo, S. and Zylberberg, A. 2014. Labor Economics, 2nd edition, forthcoming,
the MIT Press.
Ceci-Renaud, N., and Chevalier, P. 2010. Limpact des seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés sur la taille
des entreprises françaises, Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 437(1),
pp. 29-45.
Chéron, A, Hairault, J.O. and Langot, F. 2008. A quantitative evaluation of payroll tax subsidies
for low-wage workers: An equilibrium search approach, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier,
vol. 92(3-4), pp. 817-843.
Chirinko, R., and Wilson, D. 2010. Job creation tax credits and job growth: whether, when,
and where?, Working Paper Series 2010-25, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Crépon, B., and Desplatz, R. 2001. Une nouvelle évaluation des e¤ets des allégements de charges
sociales sur les bas salaires, Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 348(1),
pp. 3-34.
DARES, 2012. Lindemnisation par le régime dassurance chômage, Mars 2012, n019.
Davis, S., Faberman, J. and Haltiwanger. J. 2012. Labor market ows in the cross section and
over time, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol 59, pp. 1-18.
Davis, S.J., Haltiwanger, J.C., Schuh, S. 1996. Job Creation and Destruction. MIT Press.
Egebark, J. and Kaunitz, N. 2013. Do payroll tax cuts raise youth employment?, IFAU working
paper 2013:27.
Gali, J., 2013. Note for a new guide to Keynes, wages aggregte demand and employment, Journal
of the European Economic Association, vol 11(5), pp. 9731003.
36
Givord, P., Rathelot, R., and Sillard, P. 2013, Place-based tax exemptions and displacement
e¤ects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program, Regional Science and Urban
Economics, vol 43, pp. 151163
Goos, M., and Konings, J. 2007. The Impact of Payroll Tax Reductions on Employment and
Wages: A Natural Experiment Using Firm Level Data, LICOS Discussion Papers 17807, LICOS
- Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
Gourio, F. and Roys, N. 2012. Size-Dependent Regulations, Firm Size Distribution, and Real-
location, NBER Working Papers 18657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Hamermesh, D. 1993. Labor Demand, Princeton University Press.
Hamermesh, D. 2013. Does Labor Cost A¤ect CompaniesLabor Demand, and Who Cares?,
IZA World of Labor.
Huttunen, K., Pirttilä, J. and Uusitalo, R. 2013. The employment e¤ects of low-wage subsidies,
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pp. 49-60.
Kramarz, F. Philippon, T. 2001. The Impact of Di¤erential Payroll Tax Subsidies on Minimum
Wage Employment, Journal of Public Economics, 82, 115-146.
Moscarini, G. and Postel-Vinay, F. 2012. The Contribution of Large and Small Employers to
Job Creation in Times of High and Low Unemployment, American Economic Review, 102(6),
2509-39.
Neumark, D. 2013. Spurring Job Creation in Response to Severe Recessions: Reconsidering
Hiring Credits. Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 142-71.
Neumark, D. and Grijalva, D. 2013. The Employment E¤ects of State Hiring Credits During
and After the Great Recession, NBER Working Papers 18928, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
OECD, 2010. Employment Outlook, chapter 1, OECD publishing, Paris.
Perlo¤, J.M and Wachter, M.L. 1979. The New Jobs Tax Credit: An Evaluation of the 1977-
78 Wage Subsidy Program, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.
69(2), pp. 173-79.
Posner, R. 2010. Subsidies to Small Business?, www.becker-posner-blog.com.
Skedinger, P. 2014. E¤ects of Payroll Tax Cuts for Young Workers, Institute of Industrial
Economics Working Paper No. 1031.
Sunley, M. 1980. A Tax Preference Is Born: A Legislative History of the New Jobs Tax Credit,
in The Economics of Taxation, edited by Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin. The Brookings
Institution. Washington, pp. 391-408.
37
Table 1: The characteristics of eligible/ineligible and treated/untreated rms in 2008
Eligible Ineligible Di¤ test Treated Untreated Di¤ test
Nb employees in 2008 6-10 10-14 p-value 6-10 6-10 p-value
Manufacturing :159 :195 :0000 :138 :166 :0000
Construction :184 :185 :6620 :191 :182 :0460
Retail and transport :308 :294 :0000 :325 :302 :0000
Hotels and restaurants :097 :087 :0000 :148 :081 :0000
Merchant services :252 :239 :0000 :199 :269 :0000
Parisian area :238 :232 :0360 :153 :265 :0000
North-West :243 :254 :0000 :261 :238 :0000
North-East :121 :125 :0600 :129 :118 :0000
South-East :268 :261 :0260 :307 :255 :0000
South-West :130 :128 :2700 :150 :124 :0000
Sales below 2 millions euros :473 :218 :0000 :534 :453 :0000
Young rm (age below 5 years) :133 :100 :0000 :131 :134 :4820
Mean share of...
... male managers :207 :218 :0000 :161 :222 :0000
... female managers :120 :116 :0000 :101 :126 :0000
... male white-collar :080 :074 :0020 :096 :075 :0000
... female white-collar :209 :184 :0000 :254 :195 :0000
... male blue-collar :346 :365 :0000 :351 :344 :0140
... female blue-collar :037 :043 :0000 :036 :037 :5350
Mean share of ...
...low-wage workers :610 :594 :0000 :709 :593 :0000
...part-time workers :263 :214 :0000 :255 :239 :0000
Nb. of obs. 70; 998 30; 912 - 17; 017 53; 981 -
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : Low-wage workers earn between the minimum wage and 1.6 times this amount
(on an hourly basis). Part-time workers work below 80 percent of normal working hours. The number of
employees corresponds to the full time equivalent in 2008 (average from 1 January to 30 November). The
number of observations corresponds to the number of rms.
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Table 2: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :010
(:002)
 :008
(:002)
 :009
(:002)

Hours growth :010
(:002)
 :009
(:002)
 :008
(:002)

Hiring rate :014
(:005)

:012
(:004)
 :019
(:005)

Separation rate :005
(:005)
:004
(:004)
:010
(:005)
Survival rate :000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
Nb. Observations 405; 376 405; 376 206; 854
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent specications (columns). The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November).
The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth
rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1 and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked
between November of year t-1 and November of year t; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30
November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1
December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the survival
rate from 30 November year t-1 to 30 November year t. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions
dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million
euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of
female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust
standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1
percent.
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Table 3: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for eligible and ineligible jobs
Eligible jobs Ineligible jobs All jobs
Employment growth :010
(:003)
 :002
(:004)
:008
(:002)

Hours growth :012
(:003)
 :005
(:004)
:008
(:002)

Hiring rate :011
(:004)
 :005
(:008)
:008
(:004)

Separation rate :001
(:004)
:003
(:008)
:000
(:004)
Nb. Observations 349; 996 349; 996 349; 996
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent types of jobs (columns): eligible jobs below 1.6 times the minimum wage that last at least
one month; ineligible jobs above 1.6 times the minimum wage or that last less than one month; all jobs. The
treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees
in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size
between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1
January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of
year t-1 and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t-1 and November
of year t; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on
30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t
divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies,
as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in the
previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male
workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations
in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 4: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for wages
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
All wages :000
(:001)
 :001
(:001)
:000
(:002)
Low wage incumbents :000
(:001)
 :001
(:001)
:000
(:001)
Eligible entrants :000
(:002)
:000
(:002)
 :001
(:002)
Nb. Observations 210; 553 210; 553 105; 277
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent specications (columns). The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November).
The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the
di¤erences in log hourly wages between 30 November of year t-1 and year t; All wagesstands for the wages of
all workers present in the rm on 30 November of year t. Low wage incumbentsstands for the wages below
1.6 times the minimum wage of workers present in the rm from 30 November of year t-1 to 30 November of
year t. Eligible entrantsstands for the wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage of workers present in the rm
on 30 November of year t but not present in the rm on 30 November of year t-1 and who have been working at
least one month in the rm. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their
interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year,
the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with
di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses.
* signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
Table 5: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent degrees of hiring di¢ culties
Hiring di¢ culties Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 All
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Emp growth :015
(:004)
:015
(:004)
:014
(:004)
:014
(:004)
:009
(:004)
:008
(:004)
:004
(:003)
:002
(:002)
:010
(:002)
:009
(:002)
Hours growth :015
(:004)
:015
(:004)
:013
(:004)
:013
(:004)
:008
(:004)
:007
(:004)
:006
(:003)
:004
(:003)
:010
(:002)
:009
(:002)
Nb. Observations 73; 199 82; 752 92; 073 115; 179 363; 203
Source : DADS (Insee) and BMO (Pôle Emploi). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimates for di¤erent outcomes (rows) and di¤erent quartiles of hiring di¢ culties (columns): The treatment
group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the
previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10
(included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30
November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1 and year
t and the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t-1 and November of year t; As
covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies
for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time
workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers,
white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, **
signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 6: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates varying the bandwidth.
Size bandwidth 7-13 6-14 5-15 [5,8]-[13,16]
Employment growth :005
(:002)
 :008
(:002)
 :011
(:002)

:015
(:002)

Hours growth :006
(:002)
 :009
(:002)
 :012
(:002)

:016
(:002)

Hiring rate :012
(:005)

:012
(:004)
 :015
(:004)
 :015
(:005)

Separation rate :007
(:005)
:004
(:004)
:003
(:004)
:000
(:005)
Survival rate :000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
Nb. Observations 283; 737 405; 376 549; 022 363; 101
Source : DADS (Insee). Note :this Table displays the DID estimates varying the bandwidth (in colums). The
sample contains all available cohorts (2006-2009), and we include covariates presented in table 2. The 2nd
column is similar to column (2) of table 2 We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30
November of year t and year t-1; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t
and November of year t-1; Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant
at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
Table 7: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for all rms, with placebo years
Placebo December 2006 December 2007
Cohorts 2006-2007 2006-2008
Covariates Yes Yes
Employment growth  :001
(:002)
:001
(:002)
Hours growth  :001
(:003)
:001
(:002)
Hiring rate :001
(:003)
 :004
(:003)
Separation rate :002
(:003)
 :005
(:003)
Survival rate :000
(:001)
:001
(:001)
Nb. Observations 178; 603 270; 593
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent placebo years (columns, 12 months starting from December 2006 or 2007, instead of 2009).
The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of
size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1
January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of
year t and year t-1; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t and November
of year t-1; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 november of year t divided by employment on
30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 november of year t
divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; and the number of excess reallocation from 1 December of
year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1. As covariates, we include
year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with
sales below 2 millions euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous
year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar
workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, ***
signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 8: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates based on employment pool x sector units
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :008
(:002)
 :007
(:002)
 :008
(:003)

Hours growth :008
(:002)
 :008
(:002)
 :008
(:002)

Nb. Observations 12; 262 12; 262 6; 177
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent specications (columns) based on averaged labor market outcomes for 5 di¤erent sectors in
348 employments pools. Only employment pool x sector units with at least 50 rms are retained in the sample.
Within each employment pool x sector unit the treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November).
The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth
rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1 and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked
between November of year t-1 and November of year t. As covariates, we include year dummies, sector
dummies, region dummies and their interactions. We also include dummies for distribution of rmsage, the
share of rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers
in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar
or blue-collar workers), lagged employment growth, lagged hiring rate and lagged separation rate. Weights are
used: for each employment pool x sector unit the weight equals total employment among rms with less than 14
full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at
10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 9: OLS estimates of equilibrium e¤ects on the growth rate of employment and hours in
2009 among rm with 10-14 employees.
OLS
Independent variable Employment growth Hours growth
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Sjk :049

(:029)
:040
(:029)
:044
(:029)
:042
(:030)
Sj( k)  :021
(:030)
:013
(:031)
 :056
(:029)
 :001
(:030)
S( j)k :053
(:046)
 :014
(:089)
:006
(:048)
:067
(:089)
Test Sjk + Sj( k) + S( j)k = 0
(p-value)
:0769 :6934 :9072 :2574
R2 :365 :388 :427 :444
Nb. Observations 1; 512 1; 512 1; 512 1; 512
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The dependent variable is either the growth rate of employment or that of hours
from 1 December 2008 to 30 November 2009 in each employment pool x sector unit, among rms with 10 to 14
full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. The independent variables are the ratios of subsidized hires,
which correspond to three variables: (1) the number of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by the number of hires
in the employment pool x sector unit in 2008, among rms with 0 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the
previous year. (2) the same ratio but measured among rms belonging to the same employment pool and to
other sectors than the one considered for the dependent variable. (3) the same ratio but measured among rms
belonging to the same sector and to other employment pools than the one considered for the dependent variable.
Only employment pool x sector units with at least 50 rms are retained in the sample. As covariates, we include
sector dummies, region dummies and their interactions, dummies for distribution of rmsage, the share of
female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers), lagged
employment growth and lagged hiring rate rates, the change in the survival rate of rms within the unit between
2008 and 2009, as well as the employment growth rate in 2009 in the same sector as the unit but in employment
zones located nearby. Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector unit the weight equals total
employment among rms with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 10: First stage of the instrumental variable estimates.
IV 2SLS - First stage
Covariates No Yes
Sjk
Zjk :412

(:027)
:375
(:026)
Zj( k) :466
(:039)
:380
(:032)
Z( j)k :287
(:029)
:132
(:049)
Test Zjk = Zj( k) = Z( j)k = 0 (p-value) :0000 :0000
Sj( k)
Zjk :227

(:052)
:153
(:026)
Zj( k) :684
(:030)
:632
(:028)
Z( j)k  :089
(:038)
 :221
(:060)
Test Zjk = Zj( k) = Z( j)k = 0 (p-value) :0000 :0000
S( j)k
Zjk :006

(:004)
:014
(:004)
Zj( k)  :003
(:009)
 :027
(:009)
Z( j)k :618
(:005)
:567
(:007)
Test Zjk = Zj( k) = Z( j)k = 0 (p-value) :0000 :0000
Nb. Observations 1; 512 1; 512
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The dependent variables are the ratios of subsidized hires, which correspond to
three variables: First panel: the number of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by the number of hires in the
employment pool x sector unit in 2008, among rms with 0 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous
year. Second panel: the same ratio but measured among rms belonging to the same employment pool and to
other sectors than the one considered for the dependent variable. Third Panel: the same ratio but measured
among rms belonging to the same sector and to other employment pools than the one considered for the
dependent variable. The independent variables are the instruments used in the second stage, i.e. the
corresponding shares of eligible hires in 2008 (i.e. the ratios of the eligible hires in 2008 to total hires in 2008,
among rms with 0 to 14 full-time employees in the previous year) Only employment pool x sector units with at
least 50 rms are retained in the sample. As covariates, we include sector dummies, region dummies and their
interactions, dummies for distribution of rmsage, the share of female or male workers with di¤erent
occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers), lagged employment growth and lagged hiring rate
rates, the change in the survival rate of rms within the unit between 2008 and 2009, as well as the employment
growth rate in 2009 in the same sector as the unit but in employment zones located nearby. Weights are used:
for each employment pool x sector unit the weight equals total employment among rms with less than 14
full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10
percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 11: Instrumental variables estimates of equilibrium e¤ects on the growth rates of employ-
ment and hours among rms with 10-14 employees.
IV 2SLS - Second stage
Independent variable Employment growth Hours growth
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Sjk :055
(:097)
:023
(:096)
 :033
(:098)
:003
(:100)
Sj( k) :006
(:100)
:061
(:092)
:042
(:099)
:068
(:097)
S( j)k :043
(:095)
 :006
(:132)
:068
(:098)
:084
(:1352)
Endogeneity test (WuHausman)
(p-value)
:4080 .0556 :1435 :0072
Test Sjk + Sj( k) + S( j)k = 0
(p-value)
:2903 :5950 :4343 :2956
Nb. Observations 1; 512 1; 512 1; 512 1; 512
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The dependent variable is either the average growth rate of employment or that
of hours over 12 months from 1 December 2008 to 30 November 2009 in each employment pool x sector unit,
among rms with 10 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. The independent variables are
the ratios of subsidized hires, which correspond to three variables: (1) the number of subsidized hires in 2009
divided by the number of hires in the employment pool x sector unit in 2008, among rms with 0 to 14 full-time
equivalent employees in the previous year. (2) the same ratio but measured among rms belonging to the same
employment pool and to other sectors than the one considered for the dependent variable. (3) the same ratio
but measured among rms belonging to the same sector and to other employment pools than the one considered
for the dependent variable. These ratios are instrumented by the corresponding shares of eligible hires in 2008,
i.e. the ratios of the eligible hires in 2008 to total hires in 2008, among rms with 0 to 14 full-time employees in
the previous year. Only employment pool x sector units with at least 50 rms are retained in the sample. As
covariates, we include sector dummies, region dummies and their interactions, dummies for distribution of rms
age, the share of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar
workers), lagged employment growth and lagged hiring rate rates, the change in the survival rate of rms within
the unit between 2008 and 2009, as well as the employment growth rate in 2009 in the same sector as the unit
but in employment zones located nearby. Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector unit the weight
equals total employment among rms with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at
1 percent.
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A Appendix
A.1 The model with hiring and ring costs
We consider a discrete time partial equilibrium model of a rm that produces with labor. The revenue
function, denoted R(A;L); is increasing with respect to the productivity parameter A and increasing and
concave with respect to labor L: The productivity parameter increases the marginal revenue of labor:
RAL(A;L) > 0:
There are hiring and ring costs. The hiring cost is an increasing and convex function of the number
of hires. This function is denoted by cH(H); which satises cH(0) = c0H(0) = 0; c
0
H(H)  0; c00H(H) > 0;
where H  0 stands for the number of hires. Similarily, ring costs are equal to cF (F ); which satises
cF (0) = c
0
F (0) = 0; c
0
F (F )  0; c00F (F ) > 0 where F denotes the number of rings. An exogenous
proportion q of workers quit the rm a the end of each period. The number of separations is equal to the
sum of quits and layo¤s.
Let us denote by V (A;w;L 1) the value function of the rm, where w is the wage in the current
period and L 1 is employment in the previous period. Let  denotes the discount factor and E the
expectation operator. The value function of the rm satises
V (A;w;L 1) = max
(H;F )
R(A;L)  wL  cH(H)  cF (F ) + EV (A0; w0; L)
subject to the law of motion of employment:
L = (1  q)L 1 +H   F (A1)
and subject to H  0, F  0 and F  (1  q)L 1:
Let us assume that there is a temporary hiring credit, that reduces the labor cost of entrants during
the current period by an amount denoted . We analyze the impact of the hiring credit in the neighborood
of  = 0. In the period in which the hiring credit is implemented, the expression for the prot is
R(A;L)  wL+ H   cH(H)  cF (F )
Prot maximization with respect to H and F yields the rst order conditions
RL(A;L)  w +    c0H(H) + EVL(A0; w0; L) + H = 0 (A2)
 RL(A;L) + w   c0F (F )  EVL(A0; w0; L) + F   F = 0 (A3)
where H , F and F are the multipliers associated with constraints H  0, F  0 and F  (1  q)L 1
respectively. We now solve for the di¤erent cases.
 Case 1: H > 0; F > 0; F < (1  q)L 1: This case corresponds to the interior solution. From the
rst order conditions, with H = F = F = 0, we get:
c0F (F ) + c
0
H(H) = : (A4)
Then the current values of L;H and F are dened by equation (A4) above and the following
equations:
RL(A;L) = w    + c0H(H)  EVL(A0; w0; L) (A5)
L = (1  q)L 1 +H   F (A6)
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 Case 2: H > 0, F = 0: In this case, there are no rings and F > 0: Thus, the rst order
conditions, together with H = 0, imply
RL(A;L) = w    + c0H(H)  EVL(A0; w0; L) (A7)
L = (1  q)L 1 +H (A8)
 Case 3: H > 0, F = (1   q)L 1: In this case, the rm replaces all its incumbent workers by
new workers. The law of motion of employment implies that L = H. Then, using the rst order
conditions and the fact that H = 0, we nd that the number of hires (and employment) is dened
by
RL(A;H) = w    + c0H(H)  EVL(A0; w0;H) (A9)
The amount of subsidy paid to the rm is maximum and equal to L.
 Case 4: H = 0, F > 0, F < (1   q)L 1: In this case, there are no hires, but there are layo¤s.
The rst order conditions and the fact that F = 0 and F = 0, imply that:
RL(A;L) = w   c0F (F )  EVL(A0; w0; L)
L = (1  q)L 1   F
 Case 5: H = 0, F = (1   q)L 1: In this case, the rm disappears as there is no more current
employment.
A.2 Labor demand elasticity
In this appendix, we use the model presented in appendix A.1 to compute the elasticity of labor demand
in the current period with respect to its contemporaneous labor cost. In order to account for the hetero-
geneity of rms, let us suppose that the productivity parameter A is distributed across rms according
to the cdf G dened on the support [0;1) :
We compute the elasticity of labor demand in the current period with respect to its contemporaneous
labor cost in two situations. First, when the wage w changes. Second, when the change in labor cost is
due to a non-conditional hiring credit (such as zero charges).
A.2.1 Changes in wage
Let us study the impact of a temporary change in wage on labor demand when  = 0: When  = 0; only
cases 2, 4 and 5 can exist in the solutions of the model of appendix A.1. For the sake of simplicity, we
focus on surviving rms, so that we consider cases 2 and 4 only. When cases 2 and 4 obtain, there exists
a threshold value A > 0 such that case 4 arises if A  A and case 2 arises if A > A because the marginal
productivity of labor, RL(A;L); increases with A: In case 2, where H > 0 and F = 0; equations (A7)
and (A8) dene L and H as functions of A and w that are denoted by lH(A;w) and h(A;w) respectively:
In case 4, where F > 0 and H = 0; employment is dened as a function of A and w that is denoted
lF (A;w): Note that lF ( A;w) = lH( A;w):
Total employment is dened by:
L =
Z A
0
lF (A;w)dG(A) +
Z 1
A
lH(A;w)dG(A)
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The derivative of total employment with respect to w is
dL
dw
=
Z A
0
@lF (A;w)
@w
dG(A) +
Z 1
A
@lH(A;w)
@w
dG(A)
or
wdL
dw
=
Z A
0
lF (A;w)"F (A;w)dG(A) +
Z 1
A
lH(A;w)"H(A;w)dG(A)
where "F (A;w) and "H(A;w) denote the wage elasticity of functions lF (A;w) and lH(A;w) respectively.
Let us denote by
"F =
1R A
0
lF (A;w)dG(A)
Z A
0
lF (A;w)"F (A;w)dG(A)
"H =
1R1
A
lH(A;w)dG(A)
Z 1
A
lH(A;w)"H(A;w)dG(A)
the average elasticities of functions lF (A;w) and lH(A;w).
Then, we get the expression for the elasticity of labor demand in the current period with respect to
its contemporaneous labor cost when the change in labor cost is due to a change in the wage w :
"w  wdLLdw = (1  )"F + "H (A10)
where  stands for the share of jobs of rms that hire workers during the period in the total number of
jobs.
A.2.2 Non-conditional hiring credit
Assume now that there is a non-conditional hiring credit that provides a temporary subsidy  > 0 per
hire. The average cost per worker in a rm with employment L is
 = w   max

H
L
; 0

Since the zéro charges hiring credit did not induce rms to re workers so as to replace them by less
costly entrants, as shown in section 4.3, we neglect cases 1 and 3 of the solutions of the model of appendix
A.1. This implies that employment and hires are still dened by cases 2 and 4. Let us denote by  the
take-up rate of the hiring credit among eligible rms with a positive number of hires.37 Equations (A7)
and (A8) imply that total employment can be written
L =
Z A
0
lF (A;w)dG(A) + (1  )
Z 1
A
lH(A;w)dG(A) + 
Z 1
A
lH(A;w   )dG(A)
where A satises, as previously, lF ( A;w) = lH( A;w).
We look for the impact of a change in the average cost of labor among all rms, which we denote by
 : By denition, we have
 = w   L
Z 1
A
h(A;w   )dG(A)
37 If all hires in rms that benet from the credit are not subsidized, we interpret  as the average subsidy per
hire.
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The derivative of the labor cost  with respect to  in the neighborhood of  = 0 (where  = w) is
d  
d
=   L
Z 1
A
h(A;w)dG(A)
Accordingly, the derivative of employment with respect to  induced by a change in  in the neighborhood
of  = 0 is
dL
d
d
d  
=
LR1
A
h(A;w)dG(A)
Z 1
A
@lH(A;w)
@w
dG(A)
With this formula, we can write the elasticity of labor demand in the current period with respect to
its contemporaneous labor cost when the change in labor cost is due to a hiring credit non-conditional
on net job creation as
" 
 
L
dL
d
d
d  
=
"H

(A11)
where  =
R1
A
h(A;w)dG(A)=
R1
A
lH(A;w)dG(A) stands for the hiring rate of rms with a positive
number of hires eligible to the hiring credit. From equations (A10) and (A11) we get the relation between
the elasticities " and "w:
"w = " + (1  )"F + "H

   1


This relation takes a simple form if we assume that " is identical in all rms, i.e. "F = "H =
" = "w: Formally, this assumption is a correct approximation if, for instance, the revenue function R is
homogeneous with respect to L and the hiring and ring cost functions have little curvature, which means
that employment adjusts quickly to its target. Figure 7, which displays the adjustment of employment
over the year 2009, suggests that this is a relevant approximation for zéro charges. If " is identical in all
rms we get
" = "
A.3 Conditional and non-conditional hiring credit
In this appendix we show that
1. When the hiring credit is not conditional on net job creation:
(a) In rms where ring costs and hiring costs are su¢ ciently low, the hiring credit induces
employers to lay o¤ incumbent workers so as to replace them by subsidized workers.
(b) In rms where ring or hiring costs are su¢ ciently high, the hiring credit does not induce
layo¤s in order to hire subsidized workers.
2. When the hiring credit is conditional on net employment growth, its impact on hires and employ-
ment is the same as that of the hiring credit non-conditional on net employment growth in rms
which fall into case 1b above, and which benet from the conditional hiring credit (i.e. for which
(L  L 1) =L 1 > ; where  denotes the employment growth threshold above which rms become
eligible for the hiring credit).
To show 1a and 1b we use the model in cases where the hiring credit plays a role, i.e. in cases
where the rm hires workers. When the hiring credit is introduced, the rm may lay some workers o¤
in order to replace them by entrants whose cost is lower because they benet from the hiring credit,
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which corresponds to case 1. We describe the frontier between cases 1 and 2 in the ring costs and
hiring costs plane. More precisely, we assume that the parameter values pin down the model in case 1
of appendix A.1. We consider an increase in the hiring and ring costs, and derive the conditions when
rms cease to re any workers (and switch to case 2). We follow a perturbation method and assume that
there exist i; i = H;F; close to 0, such that the cost functions ci are mutliplied by (1 + i). Let us
denote by H(H ;F )  0; F (H ;F )  0 and L(H ;F )  0 the solutions of the perturbed system
characterized by (H ;F ). They verify:
RL(A;L(H ;F )) = w    + (1 +H)c0H(H(H ;F ))  EVL(A0; w0; L(H ;F ))
 = (1 +H)c
0
H(H(H ;F )) + (1 + F )c
0
F (F (H ;F ))
L(H ;F ) = (1  q)L 1 +H(H ;F )  F (H ;F )
Note that the perturbation does not a¤ect the derivative of the value function with respect to past
employment. Because the perturbation is small, we can express the solutions of the perturbed system
as deviations from the solutions of the initial system: L(H ;F ) = L+dL, H(H ;F ) = H+dH and
F (H ;F ) = F+dF . Then the perturbed system can be approximated at the rst order as follows:
dL

RLL(A;L) +
(1  q)
[1  (1  q)]ERLL(A
0; L)

= Hc
0
H + dHc
00
H
0 = Hc
0
H + dHc
00
H +F c
0
F + dFc
00
F
dL = dH   dF
where we use the envelop theorem to derive VL in case 1. We have:
VL(A;w;L 1) = (1  q) [RL(A;L)  w] + (1  q)EVL(A0; w0; L)
which yields in steady state:
VL(A;w;L) =
(1  q) [RL(A;L)  w]
1  (1  q)
Let us denote B = RLL(A;L) +
(1 q)
1 (1 q)ERLL(A
0; L). Because of the concavity of the revenue
function, B is negative. Then we can solve the above system and obtain:
dF =
c0HB
c00Hc
00
F  B(c00H + c00F )
H   c
0
F (c
00
H  B)
c00Hc
00
F  B(c00H + c00F )
F (A12)
The iso-curve F = cste in the (F ;H) plane is such that dF = 0: From the two previous equations
we get
F
H
=
c0HB
c0F (c
00
H  B)
< 0
This implies that the slope of the frontier between cases 1 and 2 in the (F ;H) plane (i.e. F = 0
and H > 0) is negative. Equation (A12) shows that F decreases with H in case 1. Thererefore, case 1,
where F > 0; lies below the frontier F = 0; and case 2, where F = 0; lies above the frontier as shown on
gure 15. This proves 1a and 1b in section 5.2.
Let us now show claim 2. Assume that the temporary hiring credit is conditional on net job creation
for all jobs created above the threshold employment growth rate . We analyze the impact of a small
temporary change in  in the neigborhood of  = 0 so that the value function remains
V (A;w;L 1) = max
(H;F )
R(A;L)  wL  cH(H)  cF (F ) + EV (A0; w0; L)
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Figure 15: Cases 1 and 2 of appendix A.1 in the ring costs and hiring costs plane
subject to the law of motion of employment (A1) and to H  0, F  0 and F  (1  q)L 1:
The current prot in the period in which the conditional hiring credit is implemented is
R(A;L)  wL+ max [L  (1 + )L 1; 0]  cH(H)  cF (F )
Assume that L > (1 + )L 1; the rst order conditions with respect to H and F are
RL(A;L)  w +    c0H(H) + EVL(A0; w0; L) + H = 0
 RL(A;L) + w   c0F (F )  EVL(A0; w0; L) + F   F = 0
When H > 0; H and L are determined by the rst order condition
RL(A;L)  w +    c0H(H) + EVL(A0; w0; L) = 0
and by the law of motion of employment (A1). This is the same system of equations as in case 2 above,
where the hiring credit is not conditional on net employment growth. This proves 2 in section 5.2.
A.4 Labor demand elasticity with respect to conditional hiring credit on net
job creation
In this appendix, we compute the elasticity of labor demand with respect to labor cost when the
change in labor cost is induced by a conditional hiring credit on net job creation above the employ-
ment growth rate threshold : The hiring credit obtained by a rm with employment L amounts to
max [L  (1 + )L 1; 0] :
We assume that the economy is in situation 1b of appendix A.3, where the non-conditional hiring
credit does not induce layo¤s in order to hire subsidized workers. Using the result 2 of appendix A.3,
according to which a conditional hiring credit on net employment growth has the same impact on hires
and employment as that of a non-conditional hiring credit in rms eligible for both types of credit, we
can use equations (A7) and (A8) to dene total employment as
L =
Z A
0
lF (A;w)dG(A) +
Z ~A
A
lH(A;w)dG(A) + (1  )
Z 1
~A
lH(A;w)dG(A) + 
Z 1
~A
lH(A;w   )dG(A)
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where A satises lF ( A;w) = lH( A;w); ~A satises lH( ~A;w) = (1 + )L 1 and  is the share of eligible
rms that benet from the conditional hiring credit. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
threshold  is su¢ ciently high to yield a benet only to rms with a positive number of hires during
the period. It can easily be checked that formula (A13), which we wish to prove, holds true when the
threshold  is so small that it can also yield a benet to rms that dismiss workers during the period
(i.e. for which labor demand is determined by lF (A;w)).
The average labor cost per employee is
~ = w   L
Z 1
~A
[lH(A;w   )  (1 + )L 1]dG(A)
The derivative of the labor cost ~ with respect to  in the neighborhood of  = 0 (where ~ = w) is
d ~ 
d
=   L
Z 1
~A
[lH(A;w)  (1 + )L 1]dG(A)
Accordingly, the derivative of employment with respect to ~ induced by a change in  in the neighborhood
of  = 0 is
dL
d
d
d ~ 
=
LR1
~A
[lH(A;w)  (1 + )L 1]dG(A)
Z 1
~A
@lH(A;w)
@w
dG(A)
With this formula, we can write the elasticity of labor demand in the current period with respect to
its contemporaneous labor cost when the change in labor cost is due to a credit conditional on net job
creation above the employment growth rate threshold  as
" 
~ 
L
dL
d
d
d ~ 
=
1 +  ()
 ()   ~"H
where ~"H = 1R1
~A
lH(A;w)dG(A)
R1
~A
lH(A;w)"H(A;w)dG(A) is the average elasticity of labor demand with
respect to the wage w of rms that grow above the threshold  absent the subsidy; and  () =
1
1 G( ~A)
R1
~A

lH(A;w) L 1
L 1

dG(A) is the average employment growth of rms that grow above the thresh-
old  absent the hiring credit. If we assume that the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the wage
" is identical in all rms, i.e. "H = " we get
" =
1 +  ()
 ()   " (A13)
A.5 The BMO survey
Recruitement shortages are surveyed each year by the public employment service thanks to a question-
naire called Besoins de Main dOeuvre (BMO). This survey provides annual assessments of recruitment
di¢ culties in 388 local employment pools, and 24 industries providing 8,622 estimates each year (some
industries are not systematically present in all employment pools). Firms are requested to provide, for the
coming year, the number of recruitments they plan, how many relate to seasonal needs, and how many
of these recruitment projects are considered di¢ cult. It covers all private rms as well as some publicly-
owned rms and organizations, or a total of 2.3 million plants. The majority of questionnaires are sent
by post, and the questionnaire features a response rate of about 24 %. Answers are then appropriately
weighted so that the survey is representative.
Each employment pool is made up of one or several municipalities, which are coded according to
a national classication. The industry taxonomy used in this survey can be linked with the detailed
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classication used by INSEE in the DADS. This makes it possible to match each rm in our DADS sample
with the ratio of di¢ cult recruitments to the total number of recruitments planned in the employment
zone and the industry to which the rm belongs. This ratio is presented in Table 12 for the years used
in our sample (based on 363 employment zones for which we have observations in the sample).
A.6 Cost-benet analysis
In order to evaluate the savings permitted by zéro charges on social benets, we use a survey conducted
by the public employment service Pôle Emploi in November - December 2009 on the beneciaries of zéro
charges. Pôle Emploi interviewed 3,083 rms and a total of 3,996 employees who beneted from zéro
charges between 1 January and 30 June 2009, out of 270,755 beneciaries recorded during that period.
The survey collected the gender, age, and education of the recruitees, the main reason for recruitment
(creation of a new job, replacement of another worker, contract renewal, temporary needs, etc.), as well as
the type of contract (permanent or temporary), the profession, the monthy wage and the sector of rms.
More interestingly, it also included a question on the personal situation of workers immediately before
the recruitment took place: employed, registered or unregistred unemployed, in training or at school, on
sick or maternal leave, or inactive. The correponding breakdown is presented in Table 13 for workers less
than 26 years old (64% of the recruitees) and those 26 years old or more. We use this information to
estimate the savings on social benets induced by the jobs created by zéro charges. To do so we compute
the social benets that would have been received by the beneciaries if they had remained on the dole.
In 2009, the average unemployment insurance benet (called Allocation de Retour à lEmploi) was
970 euros per month, but only 50% of the registred unemployed received it (DARES, 2012). About 10%
received unemployment assistance (called Allocation de Solidarité Spécique, a means tested scheme)
which amounted to 450 euros. Another 10% received the minimum income (called Revenu de Solidarité
Active, also about 450 euros for a single person without children), and 30% did not receive any benet.
This gives a (weighted) average cost of 575 euros for the registred unemployed. As for those not registered,
they do not receive unemployment benets as registration is a prior condition. But they are eligible for
the minimum income of 450 euros per month, which inactive people are as well, for which studies show a
typical take-up rate of 2/3.38 This provides an average cost of 300 euros per month for the unregistered
unemployed and the other inactive individuals, but only for those 26 years old or older, since younger
unemployed / inactive people are not eligible for this minimum income scheme. Students may be eligible
for scholarships, but these are rather rare. The main benet for students is one of the three main housing
benets schemes, the average amount of which is about 200 euros per month. We apply the same take-up
of 2/3, as for the minimum income, which gives an average benet of 133 euros per month for students.
For trainees, there is a specic benet (calle ARE formation) for those unemployed and eligible for the
insurance benet, which was 975 euros on average in 2009. Since only about half of the unemployed are
eligible for the insurance benet, we apply a take-up rate of 50%, which gives a monthly cost of about
485 euros. There might be other benets for non-employed trainees but they are scarcer and we neglect
them. Finally, we consider that, in the absence of the jobs created by zéro charges, those employed
immediately before being hired on these jobs would have been unemployed otherwise, and would then
have received the same average benet as the registered unemployed (since they would have just ended
an employment period, they would probably have registered rather than not to receive job search support
and unemployment benets). Adding all these benets, and using the weights of the various populations
(less or more than 26 years old, and by status), as provided in Table 13, gives an average benet per
38See http://www.social-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/1_Le_non-recours_au_rSa_et_ses_motifs.pdf
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worker of 460 euros per month. To these savings one must add the social contributions paid by the
additional employees hired on jobs created by zéro charges, which amount to 23% of gross wages, or
about 235 euros per month on average given the observed hiring wages. All in all, each job created
by zéro charges generates monthly net savings of 695 euros. This estimate excludes the cost of social
in-kind services (such as counselling, case-management and health services) typically more important for
unemployed and inactive persons than for those in employment. It also takes into account only the basic
amount of the minimum income, excluding all supplements for couples and children.
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A.7 Supplementary Tables
Table 12: Ratio of the number of di¢ cult recruitments to the total number of planned recruit-
ments by year
2006 2007 2008 2009
Average ratio :427
(:121)
:436
(:119)
:532
(:079)
:459
(:093)
Min :136 :128 :304 :161
Max :851 :799 :817 :916
Nb. Observations 363 363 363 363
Source : BMO (Pole Emploi). Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 13: The situation of workers hired with zéro charges, immediately before recruitment
Employed
Registered
unemployed
Unregistered
unemployed
Training Education
Other
Inactive
Total
Less than 26 years old 29% 36% 5% 5% 18% 7% 100%
26 years old of more 42% 39% 5% 4% 4% 8% 100%
Source :Pole Emploi.
Table 14: Number of eligible/ ineligible rms in the sample in 2008
Number of rms
Number of employees
(in 2008)
Number of employees (rm level) below 10 above 10 below 10 above 10
all 832; 910 146; 811 3; 892; 725 11; 381; 920
+ excluding temp. help agencies,
associations & agriculture
654; 047 123; 177 2; 882; 882 9; 364; 554
+ trimming extreme values 647; 230 120; 075 2; 793; 922 9; 285; 739
+ keeping 6-10 and 10-14 employees only 71; 391 31; 163 649; 825 433; 702
+ excluding missing control variables 70; 998 30; 912 646; 717 430; 109
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The number of employees is the average number of employees per rm in 2008
(average of monthly full time equivalents between 1 January and 30 November 2008).
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Table 15: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for surviving rms
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :009
(:002)
:008
(:002)
:009
(:002)
Hours growth :010
(:002)
:009
(:002)
:009
(:002)
Hiring rate :014
(:005)
:012
(:004)
:019
(:005)
Separation rate :005
(:005)
:004
(:004)
:010
(:005)
Nb. Observations 399; 412 399; 412 203; 889
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent specications (columns) for surviving rms. The treatment group comprises rms of size
between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1
December to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded)
full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November). We consider as
outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t and year t-1; the growth rate of the
number of hours worked between November of year t and November of year t-1; the number of hires from 1
December of year t-1 to 30 november of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number
of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 november of year t divided by employment on 30 November of
year t-1; and the number of excess reallocation from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by
employment on 30 November of year t-1. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as
their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 millions euros in the previous
year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers
with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in
parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 16: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates with weighted observations
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :009
(:002)
:008
(:002)
:008
(:002)
Hours growth :010
(:002)
:009
(:002)
:008
(:002)
Hiring rate :014
(:005)
:0121
(:004)
:018
(:005)
Separation rate :004
(:005)
:003
(:004)
:010
(:005)
Survival rate :000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
Nb. Observations 405; 376 405; 376 206; 845
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(rows) and di¤erent specications (columns) when rms are weighted according to their size as measured by the
number of full time equivalent employees in the previous year. The treatment group comprises rms of size
between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1
December to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded)
full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November). We consider as
outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1 and year t; the growth rate of the
number of hours worked between November of year t-1 and November of year t; the number of hires from 1
December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number
of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of
year t-1; As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also
include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage
and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations
(managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10
percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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